Abstract. This paper has two central aims: first, to provide simple conditions under which the generalized games in choice form and, consequently, the abstract economies, admit equilibrium; second, to study the solvability of several types of systems of vector quasi-equilibrium problems as an application. Our work outlines that there still is much to be gained from using the results concerning the existence of equilibrium of games as tools of research for other optimization problems.
Introduction and Preliminaries
The importance of vector equilibrium problems comes, obviously, from the great number of recent papers dedicated to the study of the existence of their solutions. We can provide a short list of references presented in our bibliography: [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] , [7] , [9] , [10] , [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] , [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] , [29] . From the scientific point of view, we must state the fact that the vector equilibrium problems unifies several problems, among which we can mention: vector variational inequalities, vector complementarity problems and vector optimizations problems.
The purpose of this paper is to provide new conditions under which the systems of generalized vector quasi-equilibrium problems have solutions. Following the approach of Lin, Chen and Ansari [18] , we firstly prove new results based on the existence of equilibrium for generalized abstract economies, results which extend and improve a number of theorems existing in literature.
We recall that the notion of abstract economy was introduced by Shafer and Sonnenschein in [28] , in order to generalize Nash's model of noncooperative game in normal form, defined in [21] and [22] . Shafer and Sonnenschein's model consists of a finite set of agents. Each agent i has a constraint correspondence A i and, instead of the utility function u i , considered by Nash, he has a preference correspondence P i . Later, several generalizations have been made. Among them, there are the generalized abstract economies, which have two constraint correspondences. In a recent paper ( [11] ), Hervés-Beloso and Patriche provided relevant examples of abstract economies with two constraint correspondences. The model of Kim and Tan [14] also contains an additional "fuzzy" constraint.
In order to establish the existence of equilibrium for a generalized abstract economy, we apply a new technique, which is completely different from the classical techniques used in literature, namely the ones proposed by Shafer and Sonnenschein in [28] or by Yannelis and Prahbakar in [32] . The method of the last authors consists of the construction, for each players, of a certain correspondence which has different values, depending on the set of points for which the intersection of the values of correspondences P i and A i are empty or not. The product of all these correspondences are forced to fulfill the conditions of a known fixed point theorem. Based on this idea, all following results had similar assumptions, especially which concerned nonempty convex closed (or open) values of the correspondences P i and A i . Our approach consists of the construction of an auxiliary generalized game in choice form.
The model of a generalized game in choice form was introduced by Ferrara and Stefanescu in [9] . Ferrara and Stefanescu's paper rediscussed the model of game in choice form, which was firstly defined by these authors in [29] and [30] .
A generalized game in choice form is the family of the individual strategies sets, the constraint correspondences and a choice profile. A choice profile can be expressed as a collection of subsets from the set including all strategies of the game. The difference, from the classical models of Nash ([21] , [22] ) and Debreu ([6] ), consists in the fact that Ferrara and Stefanescu's new model also takes into account the particular cases when the players' preferences need not be explicitly represented, or when the choice of a player need not be the best reply to the strategy combination of the others.
The rest of this section recalls some definitions and preliminary results which will be used in the following sections.
Let X, Y be topological spaces and T : X → 2 Y be a correspondence. The correspondence T is defined by T (x) := {y ∈ Y : (x, y) ∈cl X×Y Gr T } (the set cl X×Y Gr (T ) is called the adherence of the graph of T ). It is easy to see that cl T (x) ⊂ T (x) for each x ∈ X.
For each x ∈ X, the set T (x) is called the upper section of T at x. For each y ∈ Y, the set T −1 (y) := {x ∈ X : y ∈ T (x)} is called the lower section of T at y. T is said to have open lower sections if T −1 (y) is open in X for each y ∈ Y. The following lemma will be crucial in the proofs.
Lemma 1 (Yannelis and Prabhakar, [32] ). Let X be a paracompact Hausdorff topological space and Y be a Hausdorff topological vector space. Let T : X → 2 Y be a correspondence with nonempty convex values and for each y ∈ Y , T −1 (y) is open in X. Then, T has a continuous selection that is, there exists a continuous function f : X → Y such that f (x) ∈ T (x) for each x ∈ X.
T is said to be upper semicontinuous, if for each x ∈ X and each open set V in Y with T (x) ⊂ V , there exists an open neighborhood U of x in X such that T (x) ⊂ V for each y ∈ U . T is said to be lower semicontinuous, if for each x∈ X and each open set V in Y with
We recall the following definitions concerning the generalized convexity of the correspondences. The reader is referred to [18] .
Let X be a nonempty convex subset of a topological vector space E i , Y be a topological vector space and let C : X → 2 Y be a correspondence such that for each x ∈ X, C(x) is a proper, closed and convex cone with intC(x) = ∅.
A correspondence T : X → 2 Y is said to be concave if for any
Let x ∈ X be arbitrary and let T : X × X → 2 Y be a correspondence. a) T is said to be C(x)−quasi-convex if for any y 1 , y 2 ∈ X and λ ∈ [0, 1], we have either
a) T is said to be C(x)−quasi-convex-like if for any y 1 , y 2 ∈ X and λ ∈ [0, 1], we have either
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains existence results for the equilibrium of generalized games in choice form and of generalized abstract economies. The existence of solutions for systems of vector quasi-equilibrium problems is studied in Section 3. The conclusions are added in Section 4. All proofs are collected in an Appendix.
Equilibrium results
In this section, we will consider the family (X i ) i∈N of individual strategies and the families (A i ) i∈N and (F i ) i∈N of constraint correspondences, where
Xi and F i :
We introduce the following definitions, which generalize the ones due to Ferrara and Stefanescu ([9] ). These authors mentioned, in order to motivate the presentation of their new model, that the notion of equilibrium in choice does not require the players' preferences to be explicitly represented, or the choice of a player to be the best reply to the strategy combination of the others. As in the model due to Kim and Tan [14] , the correspondences (F i ) i∈N represent fuzzy constraints.
The existence of two constraint correspondences is perfectly justified by experience. For instance, in a recent paper ( [11] ), Hervés-Beloso and Patriche provided relevant examples of abstract economies with two constraint correspondences. The model of Kim and Tan [14] also contains an additional "fuzzy" constraint.
Definition 1
We define a choice profile under restrictions as any collection C := (C i ) i∈N of nonempty subsets of X × X such that C i ⊂GrA i ×GrF i for each i ∈ N.
Definition 2 A generalized game in choice form is a family ((X
, where C = (C i ) i∈N is a choice profile under restrictions.
Definition 3 An equilibrium in choice of a generalized game in choice form
is said to be a strong equilibrium in choice.
We denote C(x −i , y −i ) the upper section through (
We will make the following assumption:
Finally, we note that we determine the existence of strong equilibrium in choice for all the situations considered in this section, if we suppose, in addition, that
Further, we study the existence of equilibrium for a generalized game in choice form. All proofs will be collected in an Appendix, at the end of the paper. We underline that our approach differs very much from the one due to Ferrara and Stefanescu in [9] or to Stefanescu, Ferrara and Stefanescu in [29] . This is our first result. The assumptions refer mainly to the topological properties of the upper and lower sections of the sets C i , i ∈ N. Theorem 1 Let (X i , A i , F i , C i ) i∈N be a generalized game in choice form. Assume that, for each i ∈ N, the following conditions are fulfilled: a) X i is a nonempty, convex and compact set in a Hausdorff locally convex space
Then, the game admits equilibria in choice.
As a consequence, we obtain the following result concerning the existence of the strong equilibrium in choice.
Theorem 2 Let (X i , A i , F i , C i ) i∈N be a generalized game in choice form. Assume that, for each i ∈ N, the following conditions are fulfilled: a) X i is a nonempty, convex and compact set in a Hausdorff locally convex space
Then, the generalized game admits strong equilibria in choice.
Further, we recall that the model of a generalized abstract economy, which was introduced by Kim and Tan in [14] , is more general then the one due to Shafer and Sonnenschein [28] . In Kim and Tan's model, each agent i has, in addition, a fuzzy constraint correspondence F i .
In order to prove the existence of equilibrium for the generalized abstract economies, we attach an auxiliary generalized game in choice form and we use the above theorems. The strong equilibrium in choice for the generalized games in choice form will be equilibrium pairs for generalized abstract economies.
Let (X i ) i∈N be the family of the individual sets of strategies and let X = i∈I X i .
We will work with the following variant of a generalized abstract economy:
Xi is a preference correspondence and
Xi are constraint correspondences.
An equilibrium for Γ is a pair (x * , y * ) ∈ X × X which satisfies for each i ∈ N :
Theorem 3 introduces new conditions which ensure the existence of equilibria for abstract economies. Its proof is based on Theorem 2. Theorem 3 Let (X i , A i , F i , P i ) i∈N be a generalized abstract economy. Assume that, for each i ∈ N, the following conditions are fulfilled: a) X i is a nonempty, convex and compact set in a Hausdorff locally convex space E i ; b) A i , F i have nonempty, convex values and open lower sections; c) the set {(
Then, there exists a pair (x * , y
We obtain the following result as a direct consequence of the above theorem. It will be used in the next section in order to prove the existence of solutions for systems of vector quasi-equilibrium problems. 
We note that, according to the above theorem, there exists a pair (x * , y Theorem 5 Let (X i , A i , F i , P i ) i∈N be an abstract economy. Assume that, for each i ∈ N, the following conditions are fulfilled: a) X i is a nonempty, convex and compact set in a Hausdorff locally convex space E i ; b) A i is lower semicontinuous; c) A i and F i are nonempty and convex valued;
Then, there exists a pair (x * , y * ) ∈ X×X which satisfies for each i ∈ N :
Remark 1 Assumption d) of the above theorem implies that if
(x, y) ∈ X×X, x i / ∈ P i (x, y).
Systems of vector quasi-equilibrium problems
We start this section with the presentation of the problem we approach.
For each i ∈ N, let X i be a nonempty subset of a Hausdorff topological vector space E i , Y i a topological vector space and let X = i∈N
Yi be correspondences with nonempty values. We consider the following systems of generalized vector quasi-equilibrium problems (in short, SGVQEP):
Further, we will work in the following setting: For each i ∈ N, let X i be a nonempty subset of a Hausdorff locally convex space E i , Y i a topological vector space and let X = i∈N
Yi be correspondences with nonempty values. Suppose that for each x −i ∈ X −i , C i (x −i ) is a proper, closed and convex cone with intC i (x −i ) = ∅.
We obtain the following results which improve the theorems from [18] . All proofs are included in Appendix. We mention that the proofs are different from the ones given in [18] . Now, we present two different theorems, which concern the existence of solutions for SGVQEP (I). Both of them are established under hypotheses which are weaker than those from [18] .
We note that, in Theorem 6, the upper semicontinuity of each f i was restricted to the upper semicontinuity of each
Yi . The convexity of the values of the correspondences f i is not assumed.
Theorem 6 For each
Yi be a correspondence with nonempty and closed values. For each i ∈ N, suppose that:
solution for SGVQEP (I).
We will show that the existence of solutions for SGVQEP (I) can be derived from Theorem 5, following the method used by Lin, Chen and Ansari in [18] . Theorem 7 and Theorem 3.2.1 from [18] are comparable. After the proof, we will present a comparison between our result and the quoted one.
Theorem 7 For each
Yi be a lower semicontinuous correspondence with nonempty values. For each i ∈ N, suppose that: a) A i is lower semicontinuous; b) A i and F i are nonempty and convex valued; c) C i is an upper semicontinuous correspondence;
Remark 3 We note that no continuity assumptions was made over the correspondences
Yi are not quasi-concave in the last argument. SGVQEP (II) has solutions if we suppose that the following assumptions hold.
Theorem 8 For each
Yi be a correspondence with nonempty values. For each i ∈ N, suppose that:
The following theorem gives sufficient conditions for the solvability of SGVQEP (II), given upper semicontinuous correspondences
Yi be an upper semicontinuous correspondence with nonempty values. For each i ∈ N, suppose that: a) A i is lower semicontinuous; b) A i and F i are nonempty and convex valued; c) C i is an upper semicontinuous correspondence;
The existence of the solutions for SGVQEP (III) is stated below. 
The question, whether Theorem 5 implies that SGVQEP (III) has solutions, arises naturally. Assumptions on f i : X × X × X i → 2
Yi refers to lower semicontinuity.
Theorem 11
is a solution for SGVQEP (III).
Remark 4
The above theorem can be compared with Theorem 3.2.3 from [18] .
The existence of solutions for SGVQEP (IV) is studied at the end of the paper.
Theorem 12 For each
Yi is lower semicontinuous for each (x i , y i ) ∈ X i × X i ; c) C i is an upper semicontinuous correspondence; e) there exists
In [18] , Theorem 3.2.4 concerning the existence of solutions of SGVQEP (IV) has been established. We prove that this statement remains valid without assuming the lower semicontinuity of the correspondences F i , i ∈ N and the quasi-convexity of f i in the last argument. Instead, we assume that for each (
Yi is intC i (x −i )− quasi-convex. The proof is also based on Theorem 5.
Theorem 13
is a solution for SGVQEP (IV).
Concluding remarks
The first objective of this study has been to investigate the existence of equilibrium for generalized games in choice form and to derive new, simpler results on the existence of equilibrium for generalized abstract economies. Then, our work has focused on applications concerning the solvability of several types of systems of vector quasi-equilibrium problems. Our approach has led to new and simple hypotheses which ensure the existence of solutions for the classes of equilibrium problems we had considered.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. For each i ∈ N, let us define the correspondence T i :
The correspondence T i has nonempty and convex values.
is an open set. We apply the Yannelis and Prabhakar's Lemma and we obtain that T i has a continuous selection f i :
Let f : X × X → X × X be defined by f (x, y) = i∈N f i (x −i , y −i ) for each (x, y) ∈ X × X. The function f is continuous, and, according to the Tychonoff fixed point Theorem [12] , there exists (x * , y * ) ∈ X × X such that f (x * , y * ) = (x * , y * ). Hence, (x * , y * ) ∈ i∈N T i (x * −i , y * −i ) and obviously, (
Proof of Theorem 3. For each i ∈ N, let us define the set
Assumption c) implies that C i is nonempty. The set C i (x i , y i ) is open for each (x i , y i ) ∈ X i × X i since Assumptions b) and e) hold.
According to Assumptions b) and d), (A
All hypotheses of Theorem 2 are fulfilled, and then, there exists (x * , y * ) equilibrium in choice for the generalized game (X i , A i , F i , C i ) i∈N . Obviously, (x * , y * ) is equilibrium for the abstract economy (X i , A i , F i , P i ) i∈N .
Proof of Theorem 5. For each i ∈ N, let us define the set
We claim that C i is a closed set. Indeed, let us consider a sequence (x n , y n ) n in C i and let us assume that lim n→∞ (x n , y n ) = (x 0 , y 0 ). We will prove that (x 0 , y 0 ) ∈ C i . Since GrA i and GrF i are closed, it follows that (x 0 , y 0 ) ∈GrA i ×GrF i . It remain to prove that ( x 0 , y 0 ) ∈ {(x, y) ∈ X × X : A i (x −i ) ∩ P i (x, y) = ∅}. Suppose, by contrary, that the last assertion is false. Then, there exists z 
) ∈GrP i for all but finitely many values of n. Thus, z n i ∈ P i (x n , y n ) for all but finitely many values of n. This contradicts the fact that the sequence (x n , y n ) n is in C i . Consequently, ( x 0 , y 0 ) ∈ {(x, y) ∈ X × X : A i (x −i ) ∩ P i (x, y) = ∅} and the set C i is closed. Let us define the correspondence T i :
Assumptions c) and e) imply that the correspondence T i has nonempty and convex values. T i is also closed valued.
GrT
Since GrT i is closed and X i × X i is compact, by Theorem 7.1.16 from Klein and Thompson [15] , the correspondence T i is upper semicontinuous.
Let T : X × X → 2 X×X be defined by T (x, y) = i∈N T i (x −i , y −i ) for each (x, y) ∈ X × X. The correspondence T is upper semicontinuous, and, according to the Ky Fan fixed point Theorem [7] , there exists (x * , y
Proof of Theorem 6. For each i ∈ N, let us define
Let us consider (x
On the other hand, it is true that f i (x
The set X i is compact and therefore, we can assume, without generality, that the sequence (u 
Yi and we conclude that z
All assumptions of Theorem 4 are fulfilled and there exists a pair (x * , y
is a solution for SGVQEP (I).
Proof of Theorem 7. For each i ∈ N, let us define 
Proof of Theorem 8. For each i ∈ N, let us define
The set X i is compact and therefore, we can assume, without generality, that the sequence (u n i ) n is convergent and let lim n→∞ u
Yi and we assert that there exists a sequence (z
All assumptions of Theorem 4 are verified and there exists (x * , y
is a solution for SGVQEP (II).
Proof of Theorem 9. For each i ∈ N, let us define
, by using a similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 8, where
Now, we shall prove that P i has an open graph. In order to do this, let us consider (x 0 , y 0 , u
We can assume that lim n→∞ z n i = z 0 i . We invoke here the upper semicontinuity of f i and C i and we conclude that z
All assumptions of Theorem 5 are verified. According to this result, there exists (x * , y * ) such that for each i ∈ N,
Proof of Theorem 10. For each i ∈ N, let us define
Indeed, let (x i , y i ) be fixed and let (x
Yi and we assert that lim n→∞ z 
All assumptions of Theorem 4 are fulfilled and there exists (x * , y * ) an equilibrium for the associated generalized abstract economy (
Proof of Theorem 11. For each i ∈ N, let us define 
By following a similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 7, we obtain that GrP i is open.
All assumptions of Theorem 5 are verified. According to this result, there exists (x * , y * ) an equilibrium for the associated generalized abstract
is a solution for SGVQEP (III).
Proof of Theorem 12. For each i ∈ N, let us define
Indeed, let (x i , y i ) be fixed and let (x Proof of Theorem 13. For each i ∈ N, let us define P i : X × X → 2 Xi , by P i (x, y) = {u i ∈ X i : f i (x, y, u i ) ⊆intC i (x −i )} for each (x, y) ∈ X × X. Assumption d) implies that {(x i , y i ) ∈ X i × X i : A i (x −i ) ∩ P i (x, y) = ∅} is nonempty for each (x −i , y −i ) ∈ X −i × X −i .
Let us consider (x By using a similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 9, we can prove that GrP i is open.
All assumptions of Theorem 5 are verified. According to this result, there exists (x * , y * ) an equilibrium for the associated generalized abstract economy (X i , A i , F i , P i ) i∈N . Then, for each i ∈ N, x * i ∈ A i (x * −i ), y * i ∈ F i (y * −i ) and f i (x * , y * , u i ) intC i (x * −i ) = ∅ for each u i ∈ A i (x * −i ), that is, (x * , y * ) is a solution for SGVQEP (IV).
